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Introduction 
The CAP reform in 1992 was supposed to bring more relationships between supply and 
demand on agricultural markets. Macro-economic effects were expected, as surplus 
decreases through lowered prices and set-aside programs or transfer of charges between 
the' European consumer to the taxpayer for instance. These consequences are real but, 
more important on the long term, are micro-economic consequences on firms and on 
vertical coordination along the product flows (Brousseau, Coaldrake et al., Sporleder). 
This paper is presenting first the main features of the grain marketing chain in France 
before the reform, then the vertical coordination between farmers and their cooperatives 
bèfore and after the reform. In a third part, preliminary results of a study on three 
coopératives are presented. These results have interest as case studies (Westgren) and will 
be developped along desired research axis (Mahoney, Monier-Dilhan, Katz). They present 
significant changes within marketing contracts which may have strong implications on the 
industrial market structure, firm organizations, business conduct and performance. 
I - Insights on the 1992 CAP Reform 
The 1992 CAP Reform is due to a structural gap between supply and demand of 
agricultural products within the European Union. The structural excess supply with 
respect to demand at administrative supported prices is quite clear as early as the 
beginning of the eighties for most of the basic agricultural commodities. After light market 
adjustments, the first move towards political measures to limit the increasing supply 
occured in 1984 with the implementation of milk quotas. Few years latter, when 
discussing additional measures for various commodities such as grain, oilseeds, wine or 
meat, the long-term problems induced by a quota system started to be clear. Therefore, 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform was designed as a more dynarnic system 
with strong decrease of price support levels, direct compensation payment to farni.ers with 
respect to their acreage and a set-aside program for direct supply cuts. The reform was 
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designed to have graduai effects, such as for wheat with a three years progam of price 
support decrease, or immediate effects such as for oilseeds with complete price 
deregulations. 
The grain marketing chain in France 
Since 1936, the grain market has been strongly organized in France. Due to many market 
imperfections, an official public body called " Office National Interprofessionnel du Blé - 
ONIB " has been settled for organizing efficiently the grain market. ONIB which could be 
called " French Wheat Board " became one year latter ONIC changing Blé into Céréales. 
The final institution could then be called " French Grain Board ". Besicles the basic role of 
intervention (public buying) when market prices were below a political level stated with 
professionals, the ONIC had a role on market information for improving private and public 
decisions. Ail the companies, private and cooperatives, had to be officially registered for 
storage and marketing activities. It was the mean of a pertinent information on crops, 
storage and use of grains. Sorne would add that fiscal reasons were also present in such a 
decision. 
A network of cooperatives organization of producers was simultaneously developped for 
improving marketing activities but also agricultural methods. These local organizations 
were dealing with farm inputs, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and the rest as well as outputs, 
grain collection, storage, quality control, allotment and finally marketing. These 
cooperative organisations benefitted also of the ONIC bond as a guarantee of payment of 
the farmers. In case of financial problems of the cooperative, the farmers had the ONIC 
guarantee of being paid for their supply to the cooperative. Under restrictive conditions, 
private trading companies could benefit for the guarantee system. Therefore, they became 
to act on the market as cooperatives. - 
The grain market as organized in 1936 induced a limited price volatility for two main 
reasons as price lows were limited by ONIC purchases and cooperatives were storing 
grain at harvest time limiting the speculative pressure of farmers for selling rapidly their 
crops. During the storage period, the ONIC in relation with cooperatives was monitoring 
and regulating the market with " appropriate " selling decisions. Few years latter, after 
World War Il, this French market organisation had a strong influence on the emerging 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In conjonction with West Germany which was asking 
for high prices for its farmers, the CAP was designed with high intervention prices 
implemented under the Commission control by national public organisations such as 
.ONIC. 
The public intervention price was based upon harvest reference period. In order to induce 
storage activity, a system of monthly premium was designed. The minimum price was in 
fact incremented twice a month by a " equivalent " storage cost value"?'. The result of this 
market organization in terms of price behavior was a very particular year price cycle, like a 
1024 The system is called in France as" majorations mensuelles" 
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" stair-case " design. Based upon the political harvest price, as negociated once a year at 
Brussels by Agricultural Ministers, an upward trend was designed with a coefficient set by 
bi-rnonthly premiums. Therefore, the detrended volatility was low and, as a consequence, 
the market risks were close to zero. 
A " politically negotiated " return for grain farmers within the idea of normal return for a 
family farm associated with decreasing yield risk due to technological progress and very 
low price risk due to monthly increments induced a great success of the CAP in terms of 
quantity. After few years of CAP success in terms of quantity produced, and due to 
intervention prices above market price, excess supply above demand created large grain 
surplus within the European Union. The budget consequences for disposing these surplus 
on the international market , associated with international political pressures, induced the 
1992 CAP reform'?". 
The CAP reform, as started in 1992, brought two main changes in the grain marketing 
environment. First, price volatility increased a lot with market deregulation. Market prices 
are more influenced by fundamental supply and demand forces, but also market 
participants expectations: farmers, cooperatives, traders and users. Three crop years since 
1992 bring information on market participants behavior when faced to market price 
fluctuations. Second, compensatory direct payment at the beginning of the crop year 
brings financial flexibility to grain farmers. They become free to choose to keep the 
traditional way of marketing their crop through the "cooperative average price" or to 
change of system. 
II - Implications on Vertical Coordination 
Started in 1936 in France, and developped with the Common Agricultural Policy during 
thirty years, the grain market organization induced a dominant vertical coordination 
system. This dominant system is challenged by new designed vertical coordination systems 
between grain producers and their marketing organizations. This part is presenting the 
pre-1992 dominant system and the post-1992 chall.enging ways of vertical coordination 
within the grain market. 
2.1. The pre-1992 dominant system 
The general grain market organization, as described above, had strong implications in 
terms of vertical coordination in France. 
First of ail, the large majority of grain farmers was participating to cooperative 
organizations. The rest of farmers were mainly dealing with private trading companies 
with techniques similar to the cooperative ones. In fact, these more opportunistics farmers 
1025 The CAP reform was designed before the effective GATT negotiations. The sequential treatment of 
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were asking the private sector to do as well as the local cooperative. As a consequence, 
the objective of the trading companies was to offer the local cooperative price reference 
with a variable bonus due to market success and, more important, local competitive 
situation. Finally, the cooperative system may be considered as the basis of the grain 
vertical coordination within the industrial sector. 
- The basic convention between the producer and its cooperative 
The main feature of such system may be called " the average price method ". This methods 
involves a selling strategy and a financial technique for paying farmers with respect to the 
grain delivered. This method consists first in storing the maximum of grain at harvest time 
and selling the optimal quantities throughout the crop year, looking at signais as monthly 
increments, as stated every year, and political decisions to use stored grain for domestic 
use or exports. Restitutions levels given by the Commission for exports on the world 
market were fundamental signais. As stated above, market risks were very low, and 
market responsibles were just competing on local a basis using second-level criteria. 
The farmers, as members of cooperatives, were receiving an advanced payment at harvest 
time and a bonus payment at the end of the storage period and after decision af the 
General Assembly of the organization. Finally, ail the farmers are paid the same average 
price, which corresponds to the total sales of the cooperatives minus the industrial and 
marketing costs, and some financial provisions for further investments. 
The advanced payment represented a very hig percentage of the total payment of the grain 
producers, about 95 % on average. The risk of rnis-pricing the advanced payment was 
very low for the cooperative as the intervention price and monthly increments were fixed 
before harvest time. The financing of the advanced payment was organized with the major 
" green " bank, the Crédit Agricole, which is owned mainly by farmers institutions, and 
with the basic guarantee of ONIC on stored products. 
Finally, grain producers developped large cooperatives based upon risk pooling techniques 
and within a very low risk environrnent. But we may consider that the advanced payment 
was a critical decision criteria for farmers to join cooperative .organizations. It was the 
way to get immediate liquidities when focusing mainly on the production function of the 
farm firm. 
- The intermediation function of the cooperative 
As a consequence of such a market organization, the cooperatives in charge of the 
marketing activity in compliance of their members focused on a political role which 
consisted in regulating storage and use of stored grains. In doing so, they became mainly " 
O.S." for" Organismes Stockeurs 111026 as they are called in France. 
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Their main role was to develop storage capacities for the increasing sizes of French crops 
year after year. They had administrative retum for that activity through monthly 
increments. As a consequence, and eventhough the size of the monthly increments paid by 
the budget of the Commission decreased during the period before 1992, cooperatives 
developped huge storage capacities over the country. 
The pre-1992 period presents a situation where farmers delegate large responsibilities to 
cooperatives for disposing of their crops, within a low market risk environment. The 
cooperatives play a particular role within the market organization of storage activity for 
the type and quantities produced by farmers with a political idea of " market regulation 
tool ". Finally, there was few consideration of domestic market demand as political signais 
were so strong to farmers and the market organization so well-designed to be self- 
sufficient for taking care of whatever was produced. 
2.1. The post-1992 vertical coordination environment and characteristics 
The 1992 CAP reform has a major impact on vertical coordination between farmers and 
their cooperatives for different reasons which bring sequential effects on the grain market. 
First of ail, price volatility is slowly increasing. Surprisingly, price volatility for grains 
should not have increased so much, as the three-years designed decrease of the 
intervention price was programmed to reach more or less the " world price ", or at least to 
be very close. But grain markets have been bullish for two years and world prices jumped 
to unexpected levels. Therefore, eventhough the Commission is puting taxes on grain 
exports, domestic prices climbed also but more important uncertainty on supply brings 
volatility. Farmers are considering such high price levels and risks due to price volatility. 
They wonder how to manage this new situation with their cooperatives. 
The second effect is related to the direct payment mad ej.o farmers as compensation for the 
intervention price decrease as designed within the reform. This direct payment to farmers 
is done early after harvest time (about mid-october). French administartion get excellent 
tracks on farm records and therefore allows the European funds to be paid efficiently'?" . 
As a consequence, grain farmers get some liquidities without the technique of the crop 
advanced payments as described above. They got more degrees of freedom with respect to 
their storing-marketing organization. 
Third effect, the set-aside program is reducing the demand for storage capacities (as well 
as farm inputs on the short term after the 1992-93 crop year) with respect to stated level 
of storage supply. An overcapacity of storage on the grain market brings then financial 
problems to the O.S. with high depreciation costs within their financial statements. The 
consequence is potential lower prices paid to farmers through advanced and bonus 
payments. The farmers starts to compare the total per unit prices between them and 
between various market organizations. They start to be aware of increasing price level 
variations through cooperative efficiency. 
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Four, as a direct consequence of price volatility, the level of the advanced payment for 
crops gets more and more difficult to be defined by cooperative responsibles. The target 
value of average unit sale is quite difficult to define within the new environment. A low 
level brings a negative image within the incoming competitive market structure and a high 
level brings risk of over-payrnent of farmers and major difficulties for the cooperative at 
the end of the crop season. Farmers are considering this new complex situation of their 
own market organiazations and wander for their future relationships. 
In the meantime, new risk management tools are emerging on the grain markets. The 
French futures market, MA TIF - Paris, started in 1994 with the help of farmer 
organizations a new contract on rapeseed. Both MA TIF and AT A, the Dutch futures 
market in Amsterdam are launching a European wheat contract in 1996. Derivative 
products are exploding on the OTC market : options, composite contracts and so on. 
Farmers and cooperatives are considering such development and wander for the 
consequences on market behavior but also on individual behaviors. 
In fact, the cooperatives are loosing the political role they were designed in 1936 to play. 
The consequence of the reform is the end of the so-called "Organismes Stockeurs -O.S.", 
as tools for storing crops produced under political signais. Post-1992 market incentives 
are slowly inducing a new industry of "Grain Merchandisers - G.M." type in France. 
Vertical coordination between producers and the processing industry is rapidly changing 
with the adaptation of some cooperatives. From passive and contracts designed for 
average producers subject to administrative and political signais, new customerized 
contracts dealing with grain quality, risk management and economical surplus sharing are 
designed and offered both to farmers and to grain users. 
III - The case studies of three French grain cooperatives 
The current move from O.S. to G.M. structure has been analyzed through three French 
grain cooperatives. These cooperatives do not represent a representative sample of the 
French cooperatives. They were not choosed randornly at all, but rather they asked for an 
audit of their marketing structure and potential. The major advantage of such situation is 
the ability to capture the internai private information in optimal conditions. Furthermore, 
the three cooperatives are settled in three major geographic areas in France, the northem 
plain specialized in intensive grain production, the south-west part characterized by much 
more diversified productions, and the west part well-known for livestock and dairy 
productions. 
A set of interviews was performed within each cooperative with starting with the Chief 
Executive Officer for designing the optimal path of interviews and for naming the right 
person for interfacing and managing practical problems (scheduling main meetings or visits 
plants, elevators and other infrastructures and organizing some discussions with farmers ), 
the Chairman, then the main functional or operational staff members. 
A scale for marketing activities 
For positioning strategic market activity of the organizations in between farmers and the 
final grain user industry, and also for analyzing their changes, it is first necessary to define 
a scale or a multi-axis referential. To the present time, and as a preliminary way to 
describe various marketing designs, a one-dimension scale is used with finite extrema. 
The two extrema are « full political organisation » for the left-side as organized for 
answering pure political signais or policy instruments designed in Brussels in one hand and 
« full differentiated products organization » for the right-side designed to market specified 
products designed for satisfying identified demands. The origin of the axis could be called 
« basic product » for common and efficient use by the industry. The left-side extrema has a 
« minus two » grade when the right-side extrema is quoted « plus five ». The cooperative 
can then be positioned on this scale in a preliminary analysis. 
Minus two (or X-2) : an organization oriented towards a pure operational role (assembly 
of farmers crops, storing) selling under pure short-term administrative and political signais. 
This organization type is called above « O.S. -Organisme Stockeur » or « S.O. - Storage 
Organization ». 
Minus one (or X-1) : an organization with mixed operations, products under pure political 
signais and products with some market specificity due to local comparative advantage. 
These type of organization is therefore developing internai coordination with internai and 
extemal incentives means for inducing the flows of products in termes of quantity and 
quality. It is then a mixed or partial O.S. 
Origin ( or Xo) : an organization for handling commodities in a competitive market. In 
terms of private activity, this business is called first-hand trading using all the risk- 
spreading techniques ( or diversification). In terms of cooperative organization, we 
consider the pure risk-pooling technique of the « average price method ». 
Plus one ( or X+ 1) : an organization for handling commodities in a competitive market 
using the various tools for risk management. In terms of cooperative organization, it 
means that farmers can choose between various risk management programs as long as they 
enter a long term relationship through a formai or informai contract.. 
Plus two (or X+2) : an organization with rnixed operations, commodities and products 
specified in their final characteristics or methods of production. The organization X+2 is 
developping a very first market-oriented approach which includes a quality management 
program. 
Plus three(or X+3) : an organization X+2 type with more specific investments such as 
market analysis and segmentation, and more internai coordination techniques. In fact, the 
X+3, X+4 and X+5 cooperatives are just improved organizations in terms of tools and 
methods used for carrying simultaneously both commodity and differentiated products 
marketing, and looking at potential synergy. 
Plus four (or X+4) : an organization with an external coordination towards customers 
(informative communication, identified products, image) as well as towards farmers for 
improvement management programs, or sophisticated quality programs. 
Plus five (or X+5) : an organization of pure service between the final market and the 
cooperative members where efficiency and solidarities between coalitions are well-defined 
and implemented. 
Initial ratings of the three cooperatives : Xa, Xb and Xe 
The pre-1992 market analysis and structural organization were different from one 
cooperative to another. Through general discussions with managers, historical features, 
related rural characteristics as well as geographical market situations seem to be 
explicative variables of the pre-reform state of these cooperatives. Ail the audited 
organizations are the result of various smaller cooperative merges. As explained before 
quite a lot of cooperatives were developped in the late thirties within a general political 
move but some are much older. The very first cooperatives seem to be much more market 
oriented wit a strong philosophy of cooperative work to target market segments. Two 
over the three cooperatives had a industrial story, such rnills or bakeries, within one of 
their oldest native branch. These industrial stories, even lirnited in time or sector, are 
related to geographical proxirnity of large consumers areas. Direct market links were 
favored by short physical distances between farmers marketing organizations and final 
industrial users. Finally, the conditions of agronomy as well as farmers structure have also 
clear implications on productions in terms of quantities and qualities, and therefore on 
marketing practices. 
Therefore, the ratings of the three cooperatives in the period 1992-93 and before could be 
Xa ➔ X-1 
Xb ➔ X-1 
Xe ➔ X+2 
The cooperative Xa had seed actrvity apart from grain actrvity and Xb had some 
relationships with the milling industry which was bringing some additional ways of running 
business than the pure «O.S.» activity. The cooperative Xe was by history much more 
market oriented. Its quality management techniques were up-to-date. But in terms of risk 
management, the only offered program was the « average price system ». 
! 
Current ratings of the three cooperatives : Xa, Xb and Xe 
Three determinants of the vertical coordination can be presented: market studies as a mean 
for developing a new type of supplier/client relationship, some internat coordination tools 
and ability to support a production and/or marketing vertical alliance. 
- Development of market studies 
The three cooperatives are much aware of the general economical environment shifts. The 
local farmers are also reacting to this changes. That is why the three organizations are in 
the process of becorning market-oriented with the many problems they are encounterring. 
The basic move started with the CAP reform and GATT signature is market analysis. The 
domestic market is currently considered as the final use of products which are produced 
by the cooperative members. The market studies may be performed by various staff 
members from the commercial department or the functional staff in charge of member 
relationships. The result of the studies are related to market segmentation with various 
criteria such as market location, user demand or industrial sector. Finally, such a 
preliminary task within a marketing strategy is not as easy to start as it looks like. Two 
reasons can explaun such a situation. First, the customers or prospects are not willing to 
present their demands or have been used to upgrade the basic products they were buying 
using various technologies (wheat for breas for instance). Therefore, they are reluctant to 
give information on their know-how or simply practices. Second, the staff within the 
cooperative is not trained to run such studies ( case of Xb) or even may be reluctant to do 
it properly ( case of Xa) as it is a different work than « before ». 
Xb improved a lot its market analysis in two years. The learning process is obvious and the 
results of the studies were crucial for the whole activity of the cooperative. 
In terms of consequences for such market segmentation, a detailed study must take into 
consideration the sales force restructuring, the move from persona) to team selling and the 
way of working with brokers. 
- Development of internai coordination tools 
These tools vary in terms of scope and intensity. Quality or communication programs are 
examples of such tools. They may be limited to the cooperative as a marketing mean, 
starting after delivery of crops and ending with the satisfaction of the customer. They may 
also include the farm activity including seeds control and farm production techniques 
(fertilizers timing, pesticides). 
The cooperative Xa has plans to develop such systems but human resources and general 
organization are adapted to design and implement them. The cooperative Xb started a 
quality program including farmers with optional choice. The program started with specific 
demands from the final grain user. The cooperative Xe launched an integrated quality 
program for its total production from its already initiated program. 
- Ability to support production or marketing vertical alliance 
The ability for the cooperatives to sustain a supplying contract of specified products from 
the field to the plant of the client requires not only tools but also a complete dedicatio of 
all the human ressources of the cooperative, the political coalition as well as the staff and 
the operationals. Interviews but also internai newsletter, brochures and other documents 
give a estimation of this ability. 
The three cooperatives offer a political message for being at customer service. But from 
the three, Xa is not taking proper action for being able to service a direct customer on 
products under specifications. The cooperative Xb is working on a program, including 
training, for being such a supplier. The existence of current contracts is of great use for it. 
And finally, Xe is developping added services to some of its products in order to increase 
production alliances with the local bakery industry. There are projects to develop 
marketing alliance for selling branded French breads using characteristics of the chain 
management, from the field to the distributive system. 
Therefore, the ratings of the three cooperatives in 1996, three crop years after the CAP 
reform, could be 
Xa ➔ X-1 
Xb ➔ X+2 
Xe ➔ X+4 
The cooperative Xa is quite stable in its vertical coordination on the customer side as well 
as with its members. This organization stands as a partial O.S., therefore very conservative 
within a changing world. Its contract type with farmers stands for « average price » 
eventhough, with the pressure of farmers, the commercial department is offering risk 
diversification contracts (forward contracts, storage contrcts for instance). However, these 
contracts are not well-designed and are not finally attractive to farmers. The cooperative 
Xb is moving slowly, and with difficulties with respect to its human ressources. It starts to 
be a« Grain Merchandiser-G.M. » organization. Xb is offering ail types of contracts to the 
farmers for products considered as commodities as well as for products under 
specifications. The cooperative Xe is developing a strong ability for services between grain 
final users and farmers. This include means for quality at the farm level (genetics, 
fertilizers and pesticides) as well as at the cooperative level (grading, storing with 
rninimized costs). This includes also services to customers in terms of deliveries, quality 
insurance, technological adjustments). 
Conclusion 
The study of the three cooperatives present cases of dynamics for strategic adjustments to 
a changing environment. A period of intense competition is coming after a period of 
administrated prices. The cases present evidence of changing vertical coordination along 
the grain food chain, and especially between farmers and their cooperatives. The 
consequences should be a strong change within the grain industry with the basic move 
from « Organismes-Stockeurs - O.S. » to « Grain Merchandiser - G.M. ». However, this 
move requires specialized human resources which are not readily available. Therefore, 
restructuring consequences will be rapid among the cooperative structures in France. 
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